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Arabin, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 249;
not elsewhere reported, but a valuable
case on the point. Baker v. Barney, 8
Johns. 57.
4. Where she leaves by her own
fault. And here all agree she leaves
her agency behind her, especially when
she has committed adultery. No matter what her necessities may be, no matter how innocent or ignorant the person
who supplies her may be of the circumstances of the separation, she has no
power to bind her husband for even the
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leCutchen v. Mcnecessaries of life.
Gahay, 11 Johns. 281 ; Cooper v. Lloyd,
6 C. B. (N. S.) 519; Henderson v.
Stringer, 2 Dana 292; Hunter v. Boucher, 3 Pick. 289 ; Oinson v. Heritage, 45
Ind. 73; Bevier v. Galloway, 71 Ill
517. And this shows that her power
does not spring solely and absolutely
from her relation as wife-for she is
such still-but from some other principle, which ought to be kept steadily in
view in all these four classes of cases.
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A creditor who levies on an equity of redemption, and has the amount of the
encumbrance allowed in his favor in the appraisal of the interest set off to him,
cannot set up the invalidity of the encumbrance.
Whiteacre and Blackacre were mortgaged to A., and afterwards Blackacre to B.,
and still later Blackacre to C. B. foreclosed the mortgagor and C. upon his
mortgage of Blackacre, and then redeemed both pieces by paying A.'s mortgage,
taking a quit-claim from A. C. afterwards levied an execution against the mortgagor, upon the equity of redemption in Whiteacre, subject to the entire mortgagedebt to A., now held by B., and resting upon both pieces-the whole of that debt
being allowed for in the appraisal of the equity levied on. Upon a petition brought
by B. to foreclose the mortgagor and C. upon the mortgage of Whiteacre, originally made to A., it was held that C. was estopped from claiming that Blackacre
should be charged with any portion of the mortgage-debt.
There was no merger of the mortgage interest acquired by B. in Whiteacre,
because he had no superior estate in Whiteacre in which it could merge, and.
because, if he had, it was for his interest that it should not merge, and therefore
presumably his intent that it should not.

BILL for a foreclosure, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield county. Facts found by a committee, and decree of foreclosure passed by HoVEY, J. Motion in error by respondents. The
case is fully stated in the opinion.
r. H. Watrous and W. B. Stoddard,for the plaintiffs in error,
cited as to merger, Lockwood v. Sturdevant, 6 Conn. 390, and
Bassett v. AHason, 18 Id. 136; and upon the point that a moi t,-
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gagee will not be permitted to obtain more than his debt, .indlay
v. fosmer, 2 Conn. 353, and Porterv. Seeley, 13 Id. 564.
1H. Stoddard, for the defendants in error.
PARDEE, J.-On the 27th day of February 1867, Thompson &
Co., owning a tract of land in Bridgeport, divided into three lots,
which have been designated as P, t and S, mortgaged S to P.
T. Barnum for $15,000. On April 17th 1869, Black, Wilson &
Co., who had become the owners of the land, mortgaged P and R
to the same person for $9000; on May 20th 1869 mortgaged R
and S to the Delaware & Hudson Canal Company, the petitioners,
for $40,000; and on October 4th 1870, mortgaged R and S to
Bonnell, the respondent, for $7000. In June 1872, the title of
the Delaware and Eudson Canai Company to R and S became absolute by foreclosure. On December 5th 1872, they paid Barnum
the amount of his mortgage upon S, being $18,435.02, and also
the amount of his mortgage upon P and R, being $10,807.75, and
he gave them a quit-claim deed of his interest in the three lots. In
September 1873 Bonnell, having obtained a judgment against
Black, Wilson & Co. for $8445.76, levied his execution for that
amount upon P, and caused all the right, title aid interest of tPe
debtors therein, subject to the Barnum mortgage, then amounting
to $14,035.60, to be set off to himself, their equity of redemption
being appraised at $8217.60. The Delaware and Hudson Canal
Company having brought their petition to make their title to P
absolute by foreclosure unless Black, Wilson & Co., or Bonnell, or
some one of the various persons claiming an interest in it, will
redeem, the Superior Court has decreed that unless those persons shall pay to the petitioners the whole of the above-named
amount, they shall each and all be for ever barred and foreclosed.
Bonnell has filed a motion in error, making specific assignment of
errors as follows:
1. That the court erred in not ruling that the mortgage-debt,
amounting to the sum of $9000, known as the Barnum mortgage,
was not fully satisfied and paid, and that it was such a mortgagedebt as could be foreclosed against the respondents.
2. In holding, under the circumstances of this case, that the
merger of the mortgage interests and the equity of redemption in
the petitioners, was not a satisfaction and payment of this mortgage-debt.
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3. In holding that under the facts found, the petitioners were
entitled to foreclose the respondents from that part of the mortgaged premises called P, unless the respondents paid the entire
mortgage debt with interest.
4. In not holding that the respondent Bonnell could only be foreclosed on the $9000 mortgage, of his interest in the tract P, by
paying such a proportion of the mortgage-debt as the tract P bore
in value to the entire mortgaged premises, P and R.
The plaintiff in error insists that he should be allowed to redeem
upon payment of such proportion of $14,035.60, as the value of P
bears to the value of P and R; but, upon the trial, he offered no
evidence as to the value of either lot, and has not furnished to the
court any data for establishing that proportion. Moreover he has
barred himself of the right to ask for any division. With full
knowledge of all the facts, he caused his execution to be levied
upon an equity of redemption in P, subject to the whole amount
of the debt originally resting upon P and R; there was set to him
the entire remaining estate, as that would only suffice to satisfy his
demand; he now asks a court of equity to destroy the right of the
petitioners to obtain their debt from P, having himself recognised its
existence for the purpose of determining the proportion of the
equity which he should take upon execution; he asks to be allowed
to take property appraised at $22,000, in satisfaction of a debt
am6unting to $8445.76.
In Lord v. Sill, 23 Conn. 319, the petitioner had taken upon
execution the whole equity of redemption in land, subject to three
mortgages; he asked to be allowed to redeem upon payment of two
of them, alleging the third to have been fraudulent. The court says:
"1If he was permitted to do this, under the title acquired by the
levy of his execution, it is obvious that he would in this way acquire
a title to real estate valued at more than a thousand dollars, without making any compensation for it, whatever. The plaintiff's
argument is, that as that was a fraudulent mortgage, the defendant cannot set it up as against the plaintiif, a creditor of Hart, uider
whom they both claim. We think it a sufficient answer to this to
say, that the defendant does not set up his fraudulent mortgage,
but the plaintiff set it up and affirmed it by levying his execution
expressly subject to it; and the defendant may'well say to him,
you have not taken or attempted to take the land repre ented by
that mortgage, and therefore have no equitable claim.to it, and
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you must be willing to do what is equitable at the time when you
are asking for equitable relief."
In Waterman v. Curtis, 26 Conn. 142, the petitioner having
levied his execution upon an equity of redemption, prayed for
relief against a mortgage, alleging that it was given to secure a
debt tainted by usury. The court said: "But we are further of
the opinion that the plaintiff, by his proceedings under his execution, is precluded from claiming in this case that less was due at the
time of his levy on the mortgages of the defendants than the sum
found due by the appraisers, and subject to which appraisal the
plaintiff caused the equity of redemption to be set off to himself.
* * * Pratt being a party to the mortgages, of course was, and it
does not appear that the plaintiff was not, aware of the circumstances under which they were executed, and neither of them
claimed before the appraisers on the plaintiff's execution that less
should be allowed on them than the sum they were apparently given
to secure; although it was plainly the interest of Pratt to reduce
that amount in order to have the equity of redemption applied on
the execution at an enhanced sum; and it was also the interest of
the plaintiff to have it applied at its full value, unless indeed he
may have supposed that he could, by allowing more on the mortgages than was really due on them, have the equity set off at an
undervaluation and then reduce the mortgages on a bill like the
present to redeem them. We think, however, that he could not do
this, but that he must be held, as the case is now presented, to his
levy as he has chosen to have it made."
In Russell v. Dudley, 3 Metc. 147, SHAW, C. J., says: "The
creditor treating it as a subsisting mortgage is afterwards estopped
to deny the existence of such mortgage; if he could afterwards
avoid that mortgage and hold the whole estate, he might get it for
a very inadequate consideration."
We are not called upon to determine that under no circumstances
would a court of equity relieve P of a portion or even of the
whole of the mortgage; for the purposes of this case Bonnell has
determined the question in advance; he has specified the amount to
which P shall be burdened, so far as he is concerned; he has said
that the precise estate which he will take in it is that which remains
after payment of the whole amount of the mortgage; and the decree
is but a ratification of his own act. He has placed himself in the
position of a purchaser with knowledge that the whole of an encum-
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brance once resting upon P and R then rested only upon P; he
paid just so much less for his estate in P than he otherwise would
have been compelled to pay, and is not entitled to ask for contribution from R.
When in June 1872, the foreclosure of the mortgage to the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company was made absolute, they became
the owners of the equity of redemption in R and S; their debt of
$52,000 against Black, Wilson & Co., which was represented and
secured by that mortgage, was paid; by decree of court the equity
was made to stand for that precise debt and for no other; if no one
of those to whom the privilege of redemption was given chose to
exercise it, the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company took the
equity with the attendant possibilities as to an increase or diminution
in value. But Barnum held a prior mortgage upon R and S, by
means of which he could extinguish that equity; of necessity they
paid him $29,000 for his title to R and S, together with his title
to P. Surely this last sum, paid six months after absolute foreclosure of R and S, did not enter into and was not represented by
that decree; and as by it they already held the entire equity for
852,000, it is not to be presumed that they paid $29,000 more for
a right, with the intent to merge and lose it in that which they
already held. On the contrary, it is to be presumed, so far as R
and S are concerned, that the mortgaged title purchased from Barnum is of value to them, certainly in securing the repayment of
the money paid for it, possibly as fortifying what may prove to be
a defective title to the equity, and it is a title which they may sellBy virtue of his mortgage upon P, Barnum could have extinguished the equity therein; the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company bought this right for a valuable consideration; it is difficult
to see how it has been destroyed in passing to them for value;
equally difficult to see how Bonnell, as the owner of that equity
under his levy, can destroy their right or force them to obtain the
money which they paid for it from the equity in R and S, of
which they had been for six months the absolute owners by decree
of court for full consideration, to wit, a debt against Black, Wilson & Co.
And this purchased mortgage upon P, valuable as security for a
debt, has not been lost by falling into a superior estate held by
them therein, for they had none. It is not susceptible of being
merged in their, equity in R and S; the two rights concern differ-
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ent pieces of land; they cannot be brought into a state of legal
coincidence; and even if this were not so, in a case where it is so
manifestly their right and for their interest to preserve their mortgage title to P intact, for the security of perhaps the whole, at least
of a part, of the price paid therefor, a court of equity will not
infer an intent to merge and lose it in the equity in R and S
taken for another debt: Lockwood v. Sturdevant, 6 Conn. 373;
Mallory v. Hitchcock, 29 Id. 127; Hunt v. Hunt, 14 Pick. 383;
Savagev. Hall, 12 Gray 364; Stanton v. Thompson, 49 N. H. 277.
It is found in 1877 that in 1872 the joint value of R and S
was $100,000; that is about $18,000 more than the aggregate
amount of the debt due to the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company, and of the sums paid to Barnum for his mortgage upon P,
R and S ; and Bonnell insists that, therefore, they have no equitable lien upon P.
He was a subsequent mortgagee of R and S; he was made a
respondent in the petition for foreclosure; he had his day in court
and opportunity for redemption; he declined to avail himself of it;
presumably he did not regard it as a valuable privilege; he preferred to allow thea to take the chance of obtaining their debt
from the property. It is also found that the appraised value of R
and S in 1877 is only $40,000. He is not, therefore, now in a
position, as between himself and them, to force the mortgage resting
upon P and R wholly upon R.
There is no error in the decree complained of.
Affirmed.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
GEORGE W. FRY v. THE STATE OF INDIANA.
The legislative authority of a state is the right to exercise supreme and sovereign
power, subject to no restrictions except those of the state and federal constitutions,
and the laws and treaties made thereunder.
A statute cannot be unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of any contract
made after its passage.
A statute prohibiting the sale of railroad tickets by brokers or by any person,
except by the regular agents of the railroads, or by a bona fide purchaser of an
unused ticket or portion of a ticket, is not unconstitutional as granting an exclusive
privilege or immunity. Such a statute is within the legitimate sphere of police

regulations.
Nor is such a statute a regulation of commerce within the meaning of the federal
constitution.

FRY v. STATE OF INDIANA.

THIS was an indictment against the appellant, charging in
substance, that the appellant, on the 9th day of January 1879,
at and in the county of Marion, did then and there unlawfully
barter and sell, for a valuable consideration, to wit, the .sum
of ten dollars, to some person whose name is to the grand jurors
unknown, a railroad ticket, the description and date of which said
ticket is to the grand jurors unknown, for the reason that said
ticket is lost and cannot be found, entitling and evidencing the right
of the holder thereof, to wit, the person whose name is to the grand
jurors unknown as aforesaid, to travel and be transported over
some railroad, the name and style of which said railroad is to the
grand jurors unknown, running from the city of Indianapolis, in
the county of Marion, and state of Indiana, to the city of St. Louis,
in the state of Missouri. The grand jurors aforesaid, upon their
oath aforesaid, do further present that, upon the said 9th day of
January, A. D. 1879, at the time and place the said Fry sold said
ticket as aforesaid to said person, whose name is to the grand jurors
unknown as aforesaid, to vit, at the county of Marion and state
aforesaid, said Fry was not then and there the agent of the railroad,
whose name and style are to the grand jurors unknown as aforesaid, and said Fry was not then and there authorized to sell tickets
or other certificates, evidencing the right of the holder thereof to
travel and be transported upon said railroad, and he did not then
and there have a certificate provided him by said railroad, setting
forth his authority as agent of said railroad, signed by the managing officer of such railroad, and duly attested by its corporate
seal; that said George W. Fry had not purchased the said ticket,
evidencing the right of the holder thereof to travel and be transported by said railroad from the said city of Indianapolis, in the
county of Marion, and state of Indiana, to the said city of St. Louis,
in said state of Missouri, from an agent of said railroad authorized
to sell tickets or other certificates, evidencing the right of the
holder thereof to travel and be transported by said railroad, and
provided with a certificate setting forth his authority as such agent
to make such sales, signed by the managing officer of said railroad,
and duly attested by the corporate seal of said railroad, with a
bona fide intention of travelling on the same. Wherefore, the
grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present and charge, that said sale of said ticket by said George W.
Fry to said person, whose name is to the grand jurors aforesaid
VOL. XXVIL--54
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unknown as aforesaid, and in manner and form aforesaid, -was and
is contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Indiana."
The appellant moved the court quash said indictment, which
motion was overruled and to this ruling he excepted.
The appellant's plea was not guilty.
The issues joined were tried by the court without a jury, upon
an agreed statement of facts; and a finding was made by the court,
that the appellant was guilty, as charged in the indictment. The
appellant's motion for a new trial. was overruled by the court, and
to this decision he excepted; and judgment was rendered against
him by the court on its finding, from which judgment this appeal
was now prosecuted.
The principal parts of the statute were as follows:
See. 1. That it shall not be lawful from and after the taking effect of this
act, for any officer or agent of any railroad company, steamboat, or other
public conveyance of passengers for hire or reward, or for the operator or
operators, manager or managers (or his or their agent or agents), of any such
railroad, steamboat or other public conveyance, to issue or sell any pass,
ticket, or coupon of a ticket, or certificate evidencing the holder's right to
travel over or be transported in or upon such railroad, steamboat or other
public conveyance, subject to any condition contained in or endorsed upon or
appended to such pass, ticket, coupon or certificate, whereby the liability of
such carrier shall be abridged or limited, or whereby the rights of the holder
of such pass, ticket, coupon or certificate shall be decreased or abridged,
unless such condition shall be printed in nonpareil type, or in type or characters as large or larger than nonpareil type. Any such officer, agent, operator
or manager, or the agent of such operator or manager, who shall violate the
provisions of this section of the act, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined
not less than $10 nor more than $100 for each pass, ticket or coupon which
he shall issue or sell contrary to the provisions of this section. * * *
[Sec. 2. Provides that every railroad or other public conveyance for the
transportation of passengers for hire or reward, shall provide each agent who
may be authorized to sell tickets, etc., with a certificate setting forth his
authority, etc.]
Sec. 3. It shall be the duty of the owner or owners, operator or operators
of every railroad, steamboat or other public conveyance of passengers for
hire or reward, to provide at each agency for the sale of tickets, for the
redemption of the whole of any ticket or any part or parts, or coupon of any
ticket which they may have sold and which the purchaser, for any reason,
shall not have used, at the following rates, namely: where the whole ticket
is presented for redemption, at the full price paid for the same, and when a
part or coupon of the ticket only is presented for redemption, then the
redemption shall be at a rate which shall be equal to the difference between
the price paid for the whole and the cost of a ticket between the points for
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which the part of said ticket was actually used; and the sale by any person
of the unused portion of any ticket, otherwise than by the presentation of the
same for redemption as aforesaid, shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor, and
shall be punished by a fine of not less than $5 nor more than $50: Provided,
however, that this act shall not prohibit any person who shall have purchased a ticket from an agent, authorized, as is by this act provided, with the
bona fide intention of travelling on the same, from selling such ticket or any
part or coupon thereof, to any other person, to be used in good faith by such
person in travelling over such railroad or in or upon such steamboat or other
public conveyance.
[Sec. 4. Makes violation of the statute by any owner, etc., of a public conveyance a misdemeanor.]
Sec. 5. It shall not be lawful for any person not possessed of the authority
mentioned in the second section of this act, and not evidenced as therein provided for, to sell, barter or transfer, within this state, for any consideration
whatever, the whole or any part of any ticket or tickets, passes, or other evidences of the holder's title to travel on or be transported in or over any railroad, steamboat or other public conveyance, whether the same be situated,
owned or operated within or without this state, except as provided for in
section three.
[Sec. 6. Makes it the duty of ticket agents to post their certificates of
authority in a conspicuous place, etc.]
See. 7. Any person who shall violate any provisions of either the fifth or
sixth sections of this act shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not less than
$10 nor more than $100.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
HowE, C. J.-Errors have been assigned by the appellant, in
this court, which call in question the following decisions of the
court below:
1. The overruling of his motion to quash the indictment.
2. The overruling of his motion for a new trial.
In their argument of this cause, in this court, the appellant's

learned counsel have expressly waived all "technical objections" to
the indictment. They do not claim, "that the grand jury had no
legal authority to inquire into the offence charged;" nor do they
claim, "that the indictment contains any matter which, if true,
would constitute a legal justification of the offence charged, or other
legal bar to the prosecution." But the appellant's motion was
evidently founded upon the second statutory cause for quashing an
indictment, namely, that the facts stated do not constitute a public

offence."

2. R. S. 1876, p. 399, sect. 101.

The facts stated in the indictment, in this case, show very clearly,
that it was intended to charge the appellant, therein and thereby,
with a violation of the provisions of the fifth section of an act, enti-
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tled "An act regulating the issuing and taking up of tickets and
coupons of tickets by common carriers, and defining the rights of
holders thereof, and other matters in relation thereto," approved
Mareh 9th 1875. 1 R. S. 1876, pp. 259 and 260.
It is earnestly insisted by the appellant's counsel that this entire
statute is unconstitutional and void, upon the following grounds:1. Because it is in violation of section 8, of the first article of
the Constitution of the United States, which provides :
"The Congress shall have power * * * to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the
Indian tribes."
2. Because "it is also an infraction of at least two provisions of
the Constitution of Indiana: 1st. It impairs the obligations of contracts; * * * 2d. It undertakes to grant to carriers of passengers
privileges and immunities which it does not extend to other citizens
upon the same terms, or upon any terms whatever."
We will consider the appellant's objections to the constitutionality and validity of the statute, in the inverse of the order in which
his attorneys have presented them.
It is the settled doctrine of the decisions of this court, that "the
legislative authority of this state is the right to exercise supreme
and sovereign power, subject to no restrictions except those imposed
by our own constitution, by the federal constitution, and by the
laws and treaties made under it. This is the power under which
the legislature passes all laws:" Beauchamp v. The State, 6
Blackf. 299; Doe v. Douglass, 8 Id. 10; The La Fayette, &c.,
Railroad Co., v. Geiger, 84 Ind. 185. It must appear very
clearly that the legislation is in conflict with some express provision of the constitution, or the statute will be upheld. It is
claimed by the appellant that the statute above quoted is in conflict with that provision of the Bill of Rights, which declares that
no law shall ever be passed "impairing the obligation of contracts." We fail to see this matter in the light in which the appellant's counsel have presented it. But if it could be said that the
statute did impair the obligation of contracts existing at the time
of its passage, the effect would be, as it seems to us, that as to such
existing contracts the statute would be inoperative and of no effect,
while it might be and would be, if no other objection existed, constitutional and valid as to all future contracts. The transaction on
which the indictment in this case was predicated, occurred nearly

FRY r. STATE OF INDIANA.

four years, as alleged, after the passage of the act in question; and
it cannot be said, we think, that the statute impaired the obligation
of any contract in connection with that transaction. This objection
to the constitutionality of the statute was not well taken, and cannot
be sustained in any view of the question.
The second objection, urged by the appellants, to the validity of
the statute, under our state constitution, is that it is in conflict with
that section of the Bill of Rights, which declares that "the General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens,
privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not
equally belong to all citizens." In discussing this objection, the
appellant's counsel say of the statute : "It grants to any common
carrier the exclusive right to purchase the unused portion of its
tickets, and does not, under any circumstances, permit any other
person to engage in the purchase thereof, and extends to said
carriers immunity from all competition in the purchase and sale of
such tickets. It simply is enabling a monopoly to be more exclusive." We do not think that this is a fair statement of the purport
and effect of the statute. It does not grant a right to, but imposes a
duty upon, the common carrier of passengers to purchase the unused
portion of its tickets. It does not prevent but expressly allows the
sale by the bona fide holder of such unused portions of tickets to
any other person, to be used by such person in good faith, in travelling therewith. It prohibits a general brokerage business in the
buying and selling of such unused portions of tickets, except under
well-defined restrictions. The provisions of the statute, in this
regard, are manifestly police regulations, and whatever may be said
either for or against the justice or the wisdom of these regulations,
it is certain, we think, that, in their enactment, the legislature did
not exceed their legitimate power under our state constitution. It
is neither the province nor the duty of the courts to call in question either the policy or wisdom of any act of legislation. The
learned attorneys of the state have stated, clearly and explicitly, in
their argument of this cause, some of the motives which may possibly have induced the General Assembly to enact the statute now
under consideration. Without endorsing in anywise this statement,
it may not be improper for us to set out, in this connection, a
statement of the views of the representatives of the state, in this
prosecution, as to the probable reason for the enactment of this
statute. Counsel say, 'If the legislature believed that spurious
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tickets were being put upon the market by means of brokers, of
such kind as to make detection difficult, and in such numbers as to
amount to a serious injury to the people or the railroad companies,
or if they believed that their officers furnished a market for stolen
tickets, and aided employers of the railroads or other persons in
carrying on a nefarious business, and a business dangerous both to
the railroads and their patrons, and if they further believed that
the brokers were of little or no advantage to anybody, then they
might well enact such a statute as this as the best means of correcting an existing evil. And if it seemed wiser to the legislature to
strike directly at the brokers, and make their business unlawful,
than to attempt to punish those who stole genuine or issued spurious
tickets, they had the same right to take that course that they have
to make a man a criminal who enters a house for gaming purposes,
and thus assists gamesters, who are also criminals, in preying upon
society."
In our opinion, the statute under consideration is not open to the
second objection urged by the appellant's counsel against its validity, under the provisions of our state constitution.
We pass now to the consideration of the main ground of objection, presented by the appellant's attorneys, to the constitutionality
and validity of the statute above quoted, namely, that it is in
violation of section 8th of the first article of the constitution of
the United States, which provides :"The Congress shall have power * * * to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the
Indian tribes."
In discussing this second objection to the statute under consideration, the appellant's counsel lay down the following propositions,
with the purpose of establishing the same, in and by their argument :"1. That the word 'commerce,' as used in this section of the
constitution, includes passenger travel, and hence any regulation
of passenger travel is a regulation of commerce.
"12. That the power vested in Congress to regulate commerce, as
applied to interstate passenger travel, is exclusive, and that the
states have no power whatever to legislate upon this subject, even
in the absence of legislation upon the part of Congress.
"3. That, conceding that the right to regulate commerce exists
in the states, until Congress has exercised its powers in that behalf,
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Congress has so far exercised that power as to preclude any action
on the part of the states.
"4. That the statute does attempt to regulate passenger travel
among the states, and hence is void; and
"5. That such statute is not a legitimate exercise of the police
power, which, confessedly resides in the several states."
We need not, in this opinion, consider or comment upon any of
these propositions of the appellant's counsel, except the fourth and
fifth. We do not think, that the first three of the five propositions,
laid down by counsel, are in any manner involved in the case now
before us. We recognise the constitution of the United States, and
the acts of Congress pursuant thereto, as the supreme law of the
land.
It may be conceded that the word commerce, as used in section
8, above quoted, of the first article of the federal constitution,
includes within its scope and meaning interstate passenger travel;
and that the power vested in Congress to regulate commerce, as
applied to such travel, is so far exclusive in its character, as that
the states may not, by any act of legislation, impose burdens upon
either the carrier or the passenger, which would obstruct or hinder
the free course of travel. Such we understand to be the purport
and effect of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, in construing the section above quoted. Gibbons v. Ogden,
9 Wheat. 1; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; Henderson v. The
Mayor, &e., 92 U. S.259; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 Id. 275;
Railroad Co. v. Hfazen, 95 Id. 465. In three cases, the doctrine
is firmly maintained, that Congress has the exclusive power to regulate commerce, including interstate passenger travel; and in the
case last cited, the court define the term commerce, and what is
meant by a regulation of commerce, as follows: "Transportation
is essential to commerce, or rather it is commerce itself; and every
obstacle to it, or burden laid upon it, by legislative authority, is
regulation."
From this definition of the term regulation, as applied to commerce, it would seem that a state statute, which placed no obstacle
in the way of, and imposed no burden upon, interstate passenger
travel. could not be said to "invade the domain of the national
government," and could not, for that reason, be held to be unconstitutional and void. It cannot be said, we think, that the statute
of this state, above quoted, in any manner impedes, obstructs, or
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casts any burden upon, the free course of commerce, in so far as interstate passenger travel is concerned. The statute imposes certain
prescribed duties upon common carriers of passengers and their
agents, but the discharge of these duties does not and cannot, as it
seems to us, obstruct or hinder, or cast any burden upon, the commerce of the country or interstate passenger travel. The act absolutely prohibits, and makes unlawful, the sale, barter or transfer,
within this state, by any person not authorized thereunto as provided in said act, for any consideration whatever, of the whole or
any part of any ticket or tickets, passes, or other evidences of the
holder's right to travel, &c. That far forth, the provisions of the
statute must be regarded, as we have already said, as police regulations, the evident object and purpose of which were to prevent and
prohibit a general brokerage business in the purchase and sale of
such tickets, &c., and the unused portions thereof. We fail to see,
that these regulations are obstacles to, or burdens upon, interstate
commerce, in any sense of that term.
In the case 'of Railroad GOb. v. Hazen, supra, the Supreme
Court of the United States says, "We admit that the deposit in
Congress of the power to regulate foreign commerce, and commerce
among the states, was not a surrender of that which may properly
be denominated police power. What that power is, it is difficult to
define with sharp precision. It is generally said to extend to making
regulations promotive of domestic order, morals, health and safety.
* * * * * It may also be admitted, that the police power of a
state justifies the adoption of precautionary measures against social
evils. Under it a state may legislate to prevent the spread of
crime, or pauperism, or disturbance of the peace." If, in the exercise of its police power, a state enacts certain regulations, which
are neither obstacles to, nor burdens upon, interstate commerce, it
cannot be said, we think, that such legislation invades the domain
of legislation which belongs exclusively to the Congress of the
United States; namely, because it relates to subjects which, to
some extent, are connected with interstate commerce. For, as we
understand the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States,
in the case last cited, the state legislatures are prohibited, by said
section 8, of the first article, of the federal constitution, from enacting such regulations only, in relation to interstate commerce, as
would be either obstacles to, or burdens upon, such commerce. If
this view of the matter under consideration is correct,-and we
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think it is,-it follows very clearly that the statute of this state,
above quoted, is not in violation of section 8, article 1, of the
constitution of the United States, and is not, therefore, unconstitutional and void.
In the same section, of the same article, of the Constitution of
the United States, it is also provided that "The Congress shall have
power * * * to promote the progress of science and useful arts,
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries." The power thus
given was early exercised, and since has been continuously exercised, by Congress in the enactment from time to time of suitable
laws for the purposes indicated. The power thus exercised is
exclusive, in its origin and nature, as the power to regulate foreign
or interstate commerce. In Ex parte Robinson, 2 Bissell 309, it
was held by DAvis, J., then a learned and eminent justice of the
U. S. Supreme Court, presiding in the U. S. Circuit Court, in this
district, as follows: "The property in inventions exists by virtue
of the laws of Congress, and no state has a right to interfere with
its enjoyment, or to annex conditions to the grant. If the patentee
complies with the law of Congress on the subject, he has a right to
go into the open market anywhere within the United States and
sell his property." This court adopted and followed the- doctrine
of the case cited, in Helm v. The First National Bank of Huntington, 43 Ind. 167, and in The Grover& Baker Sewing Mahine
Co. v. Butler, 53 Id. 454.
In the recent case of Patterson v. Kentucky, decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States, in February 1879, the exclusive power of Congress to legislate, on the subject of property in
inventions, was claimed by the plaintiff in error, and that a statute
of Kentucky, which imposed a fine on any one who should sell for
certain purposes a certain patented article, possessed of certain
qualities, was unconstitutional and void, because it was inconsistent
with the federal constitution, and the laws of Congress pursuant
thereto. In an able and exhaustive opinion, Mr. Justice HARLAN
lays down the doctrine, in that case, that "obviously" the right of
a patentee, under the constitution and laws of the United States,
"is not granted or secured, without reference to the general powers
which the several states of the Union unquestionably possess, in
reference to their purely domestic affairs,- whether of internal
VOL. XXVIL-55
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commerce or of police." The learned judge quotes with approval
and, to some extent, grounds his opinion upon, the following
excerpts from Mr. Cooley's excellent Treatise on Constitutional
Limitations, to wit: "In the American constitutional system, the
power to establish the ordinary regulations of police has been left
with the individual states and cannot be assumed by the national
government. * * * If the power extends only to a just regulation
of rights with a view to the due protection and enjoyment of all,
and does not deprive any one of that which is justly and properly
his own, it is obvious that its possession by the state, and its
exercise for the regulation of the property and actions of its
citizens, cannot well constitute an invasion of national jurisdiction,
or afford a basis for an appeal to the protection of the national
authorities." Page 574. In the case cited, it was held by the
Supreme Court of the United States, that the Kentucky statute
was a police regulation within the power of the state, and was not
in violation of the constitution and laws of the United States.
We have cited the case, in this connection, not because it is directly
in point, but because it contains the latest expression we have seen,
of the views of the Supreme Court of the United States upon
subjects which are, at least, closely allied to the questions involved
in this case. Of course, in so far as the doctrine of the case cited
is in conflict with the decisions of this court, in the cases above
cited or any other cases, in our reports, the latter cases must be
and are overruled.
In the case at bar, our conclusion is that the statute of this state,
above quoted, is not in conflict with the constitution or laws of the
United States, but was a legitimate exercise by the state legislature
of the police powers of the state. Therefore, we hold that no
error was committed by the court below, in overruling the appellant's motion to quash the indictment.
No point is presented for decision, by the appellant's counsel in
argument, arising under the alleged error of the court, in overruling the appellamt's motion for a new trial. That error, even if
it existed, must therefore be regarded as waived.
The judgment is affirmed, at the appellant's costs.
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Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
FRITZ STEFFEN v. THE CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN
RAILWAY COMPANY.
Negligence is not to be presumed in the absence of evidence tending to prove it.
A party charging negligence as the ground of his action takes the onus probandi.
But the nature of the injury may in some cases raise a presumption of negligence.
A servant who engages in the performance of services for compensation, does,
as an implied part of the contract, take upon himself, as between himself and his
master, the natural risks and perils incident to the performance of such services.
But where there are latent risks which are known to the master it is his duty to
notify the servant. And when they arise from no negligence of the master but
are incilent to the nature of the service, and unknown to the master through no
negligence of his, the risk is with the servant, not with the master.

APPEAL

from Dane county.

Jones and Parkinson,for respondent.

Smith and Lamb, for appellant.
C. J.-The respondent brought his action for the appellant's negligence, and it was incumbent on him to establish it.
Negligence is not to be presumed in the absence of evidence tending
to prove it. A plaintiff charging negligence as the ground of his
action takes the onus probandi. The nature of an injury may
indeed, in some cases, raise a presumption of negligence. But the
respondent's injury is not of such a character. He established no
cause of action without evidence tending to show the appellant's
negligence in causing his injury: Wharton's Neg., sect. 421;
Xorrisn v. P. & C. Construction Co., 44 Wis. 405; Nitro-ClycerRYAN,

ine Case, 15 Wall. 524.

As the respondent's evidence left the case, his injury appeared
the result of unaccountable accident. There was no evidence
tending to show where the stone which struck him came from, or
how or by what it was put in motion. The whole body of the
evidence rendered it most improbable, indeed nearly or quite impos.
sible, that it could have come from that part of the track between
the rails, by force of the passing train. All the gravel on that
part of the track appears to have been several' inches below the
cow-catcher, the lowest part of the train. And there was nothing
to show that the stone could have come from that part of the track
outside of the rails. The cause of the acaident rested in pure
conjecture, without evidence tending to explain it or to connect it
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in any way with any negligence of the appellant. At the close of
the respondent's evidence it appeared to be a case of unaccountable
misadventure, for which no one was responsible: HYarvey v. Dunlap,
Supplt. to Hill & Denio 193; Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292;
Nitro-Glycerine Case, supra; and a nonsuit ought to have been
granted when the respondent rested.
The appellant, however, gave evidence of some experiments
tending to account for the injury. These experiments raise some
presumption, perhaps a strong one, that the stone came from the
outside of the rail, next to and nearly or quite directly opposite the
respondent where he was struck. It appears that such stones,
placed on the head of a spike and rested against the outside of the
rails, were several times driven by a passing train, at a right angle
or nearly so from the rail, with force enough to cause such an injury
at such a distance. If these experiments do not account for the
accident, it still remains unaccountable. And the case .will be
considered on the presumption which the experiments raise.
The negligence imputed to the appellant is the failure of the
boss of some workmen, of whom the respondent was one, to remove
-the stone upon the approach of the train, so that the injury could
not have occurred. If the boss of a gang of mere laborers, himself
little or no more, should be held chargeable with notice of such a
danger, the law would impute to him knowledge of a law of motion
quite new to every member of the court upon the argument of this
appeal. But the evidence primafacie establishes that, if leaving
such a stone in such a place were negligence, it was the negligence
of the respondent himself
The learned counsel for the respondent dwelt much upon the
duty of the appellant to keep its track in order. There is no
necessity to insist upon the duty of a railroad company to keep its
track in good order, for the purposes for which it is built; the safe
passage of trains. And these workmen appear to have been
employed to perform this very duty.for the appellant, at the locus
in quo. The track had been raised, and the men were engaged in
ballasting it with gravel lying at the side of the track. It appears
to have been the duty of each man so employed to shovel gravel
upon the track in front of him, until there should be enough so
shovelled up as to need levelling on the track, and thereupon to
level it from time to time, as might be necessary; each workman
for himself, to the extent of his own work. This appears to have
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been mere labor, not skilled labor in any sense. And the o.fce of
the boss appears to have been chiefly or wholly to see that the men
under him performed their duty.
Assuming the theory of the experiments, the stone which injured
the respondent was, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
presumably thrown up by himself, in his own immediate front; and
if it should have been removed from the tie, it was his own duty to
remove it. Indeed it seems to have been impracticable for the
boss of the work to examine the work in detail, at the approach of
trains, in order to guard against such possibilities as the one in
question, without keeping his men idle a great part of their time.
His first and paramount duty of supervision was to see the track
safe for passing trains. And before the happening of this accident
no rule of ordinary care could well have required him to inspect
the track outside of the rails, at the approach of every train.
The relation of master and servant does not imply the master's
guaranty of the servant's safety. "A servant," says BLACKBURN,
J., in lorgan Y. Railway Co., 5 B. & S. 570, "who engages in
the performance of services for compensation, does, as an implied
part of the contract, take upon himself, as between himself and his
master, the natural risks and perils incident to the performance of
such services." This rule is universal: Wharton's Neg., sect. 201,
205; Strahlendorfv. Ro8enthal, 80 Wis. 674; Priestly v. Powler,
8 Mees. & Wels. 1; Riley v. Bazendale, 6 Hurlst. & N. 445;
Woodley v. Railway Co., Law Rep. 2 Ex. 384; Gibsony. Railway

Co., 68 N. Y. 449; Hayden v. Man'fg Co., 29 Conn. 548; Ladd
v. Railroad Co., 119 Mass. 412.
There may be latent risks in an employment. Where these are
known to the master, it is his duty to notify the servant. But
when they arise from no negligence of the master, but are incident
to the nature of the service, and unknown to the master through
no negligence of his, the risk is with the servant; not with the
master: Wharton's Neg., 206-211.
Whether the injury of the respondent arose from unaccountable
accident, or from an occult risk incident to his employment, the
respondent is not entitled to recover. And the" appellant's second
motion for a nonsuit, at the close of the evidence, should have
been granted.
The judgment is reversed and the cause- remanded to the court
below for a new trial.
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Supreme Court of N ew Brun8wick.
ARMSTRONG v.THE GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY CO.
Goods were delivered to the defendants at Montreal, for which they gave the
following receipt : " Montreal Station, July 26th 1873. Received from D. Bell
the under-mentioned property, addressed to John Armstrong, St. John, N. B., to
be sent by the Grand Trunk Railway Co., of Canada, subject to the terms and conditions stated on the other side." [Then followed the description and marks of
the goods.] The conditions printed on the back of the receipt were, inter alia,
that the company would not be responsible for damages occasioned by delays from
over-pressure of freight, or from fire ; and that goods addressed to cousignees at
points beyond the company's stations, and respecting which no directions to the
contrary should have been received at those stations, would be forwarded to their
destination by public carrier, or otherwise, as opportunity might offer, without
any claim for delay against the company for want of opportunity to forward them ;
or they would, at the discretion of the company, be placed in their warehouse, pending communication with the consignees, at the risk of the owners, for any damage
arising from any cause whatever. The goods were sent from Montreal by the
defendant's railway to Portland, Maine, the terminus of their line, and stored in
their warehouse there, where they were accidentally destroyed by fire on the 9th
of August. It was not shown when they reached Portland,,but it was proved that
goods received at Montreal on the 29th of July would arrive at Portland about
the 4th or 5th of August by freight train, and that freight for St. John arriving at
Portland was generally forwarded by steamboats, which ran three times a week;
and in 1873 there was an agreement between the railway company and the steamboat company respecting the carriage of freight, but the particulars of it were not
proved. There was no evidence about the payment of the freight on the goods:
Hed, 1. That the duty of the defendants as common carriers ended on the arrival
of the goods at Portland, after which time they held them as warehousemen, and
were not liable for their loss without proof of negligence. 2. That there was not
sufficient evidence of negligence in not forwarding the goods from Portland before
the fire. 3. That in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it would be presumed
that Bell, the plaintiff's agent, had seen the conditions on the back of the receipt,
and therefore the plaintiff was bound by them. 4. That even if a promise by their
freight agent to pay for the goods would bind the company, a conditional promise
to pay, if the goods were not insured by the plaintiff, would not be binding without proof of non-insurance.

THIS was an action on the case against the defendants as common carriers, for the loss of two cases of merchandise belonging
to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff purchased the goods through his agent, Duncan
Bell, by whom they were delivered to the defendants at Montreal,
on the 26th of July 1873, and who received a bill of lading from
the defendants, in the following words:"Special notice. The company will not be responsible for any
goods missent, unless they are consigned to a station on their railway. Rates and weights entered on receipts or shipping bills will
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not be acknowledged. All goods going to or from the United States
will be subject to customs charges, &c.
GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY."

"Montreal Station, July 26th 1873. Received from Duncan
Bell, the undermentioned property, in apparent good order,
addressed to John Armstrong, St. John, N. B., to be sent by the
Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada, subject to the terms
and conditions stated above, and upon the other side, and agreed to
by this shipping note delivered to the company at the time of
giving the receipt therefor." [Then followed the description and
marks of the goods.]
The conditions referred to, printed on the back of the receipt, so
far as they relate to this case, were as follows:"General notices and conditions of carriage. It is understood
and agreed that the Grand Trunk Railway will not be responsible
* * * (3) for damages occasioned by delays from storms, accidents,
overpressure of freight, or unavoidable causes, or for damages from
the weather, fire, heat, frost or delay of perishable articles, or from
civil commotion.
"(10). That all goods addressed to consignees at parts beyond
the places at which the company have stations, and respecting which
no directions to the contrary shall have been received at these stations, will be forwarded to their destination by public carrier, or
otherwise, as opportunity may offer, without any claim for delay
against the company for want of opportunity to forward them; or,
they will, at the discretion of the company by whom they may have
been received, be suffered to remain on the company's premises, or
be placed in shed or warehouse (if there be convenience for receiving the same), pending communication with the consignees, at the
risk of the owners, for any damage arising from any cause whatever, * * * and in case of loss or damage to any goods for which
the company may be liable, it is agreed and understood that they,
shall have the benefit of any insurance effected by, or for account of
the owner of the said goods, before any demand shall be made."
The goods were sent from Montreal by the defendant's railway,
to Portland, Maine, the terminus of the railway, and were stored.
in their warehouse there, and were destroyed hy fire on the 9th of
August, when a considerable part of Portland was burnt. The
fire occurred without any negligence on the part of the defendants,
It did not appear when the goods reached Portland, but it was
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proved that goods received at Montreal on the 29th of July, would
arrive in Portland about the 4th or 5th of August in ordinary course
by freight trains ; and that goods sent from Montreal by that line, and
thence to St. John by steamboat, did not generally reach St. John
in less than a fortnight. Freight arriving at Portland by the
Grand Trunk Railway, was generally forwarded to St. John by the
boats of the International Steamboat Company. It was stated,
that in 1873 there was a written agreement between that company
and the defendants, respecting the carriage of freight, but the
agreement was not proved. The boats of the International Steamboat Company ran three times'a week between Portland and St.
John, and in August 1873, were carrying a good deal of freight,
being sometimes crowded with it. Some correspondence took place
after the fire, between the plaintiff and the defendants' freight
agent in which the latter stated, that the company would pay for
the goods if they were not insured, of which there was no evidence
At the close of the plaintiff's case, it was agreed that a verdict
should be entered for the plaintiff for the value of the goods, subject
to leave to the defendants to move to enter a nonsuit, and that the
following questions should be left to the jury:
1. Were the defendants guilty of negligence in not forwarding
the goods to the plaintiff at St. John, before the fire on the 9th of
August.
2. Were the conditions of the way-bill brought to the knowledge
of Duncan Bell by the defendants ?
8. Did the defendants, by their agent, Stevenson, with full knowledge of the facts, promise, after the fire, to pay the plaintiff for the
goods?
The jury answered the first and third questions in the affirmative, and the second in the negative.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ALLEN, C. J.-The first question which arises in the case is,
when did the defendant's liability as common carriers end? Did it
continue until the goods arrived at St. John, or did it end in Portland, the terminus of their line of railway? And did the defendants contract to carry the goods from Montreal to St. John?
We think their liability as carriers ended at Portland, and if
they incurred any liability after the arrival of the goods there, it
must be in some other character than that of common carriers.
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Prima facie, the defendants were only common carriers between
Montreal and Portland, and their liability as such, for the safety
of the goods, would cease when they arrived there, unless it was
shown that they became carriers beyond that, and did not limit
their responsibility to the transit between Montreal and Portland.
There is no evidence that they undertook to carry the goods beyond
Portland, unless such an obligation arises from the way-bill or
receipt which was signed when they received the goods; and we
think it is very clear from the language of the 10th condition, that
they intended to assume a different character in respect to their
dealings with the goods after their arrival at Portland from that in
which they stood before. They undertake that the goods shall be
forwarded to their destination by public carrier, or otherwise "as
opportunity may offer," and stipulate that they will not be responsible for any loss or damage to goods so sent, nor for any
delay which happens beyond their line. In Gar8ide v. The Trent
and Mersey Navigation Co., 4 T. R. 581, the defendants were
carriers between Stourport and Manchester; they received goods
directed to the plaintiff at Stockport, which they carried safely to
Manchester, and put into their warehouse there, where they were
accidentally destroyed by fire that night, and before any carrier
came from Stockport to whom they could be delivered. It appeared
that according to the course of business, when goods were sent from
Stourport to go beyond Manchester, if any carrier to their place of
destination was at Manchester ready to receive them, they were
delivered to him on payment of the carriage to Manchester; but
if not, the defendants kept them in their warehouse till a carrier
arrived. It was held that the defendants had the goods as warehousemen, and not as carriers, and, therefore, were not liable for
their loss.
In Muschamp v. The Lancaster & Preston Railway Co., 8 M.
& W. 421, the defendants were common carriers between Lancaster and Preston; at the latter place, their line joined the North
Union Railway. They received a box from the plaintiff, to be
carried to a place beyond Preston; it arrived safely at Preston, but
was lost after being sent from thence by the North Union Railway.
On these facts the judge directed the jury that where a common
carrier took into his care a parcel directed to a particular place, and
did not, by positive agreement, limit his responsibility to a part
only of the distance, that was prima facie evidence of an underVora. XXVIL-56
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taking on his part, to carry the parcel to the place to which it was
directed; and that the same rule applied, though the places were
beyond the limits in which he in general professed to carry on his
business of a carrier. This ruling was held by the Court of
Exchequer to be correct. The same principle was affirmed in
Watson v. Ambergate Bailway Co., 15 Jur. 448, where the defendants received a parcel to be conveyed to Cardiff, their line only
extending to Nottingham, and they were held answerable for its
loss, though it happened beyond their own line. So also in Scotthorn v. South ,StaffordshireRailwall Co., 8 Exch. 341. But in
neither of these cases was there anything to show that the railway
company intended to limit its responsibility to the terminus of its
own railway, which, it 'was admitted, might have been done. In
that respect, therefore, those cases are, in our opinion, distinguishable from the present case. The case of Collins v. The Bristol and
Exeter Bailwa=y Co., 11 Exch. 790, more nearly resembles the
present case, and unless it can be distinguished, would certainly seem
to. support the plaintiff's contention that the defendants in this case
undertook to carry the goods to St. John. In that case the plaintiff
delivered goods to the Great Western Railway Company at Bath, one
of their stations, to be conveyed to Torquay. He signed a receipt,
headed, "The Great Western Railway Company, received the undermentioned goods, on the conditions stated on the other side, to be
sent to Torquay station, and delivered to the plaintiff or his agent."
One of the conditions was, that the company would not be answerable for loss or damage by fire. Another condition stated, that
the company would not be responsible for loss or damage to goods
beyonds the limits of their railway, and (in terms very similar to
the 10th condition here), that goods addressed to consignees beyond
the limits of the company's railway, and respecting which no directions to the contrary should have been received, would be forwarded
to their destination by public carriers or otherwise, as opportunity
might offer. That the charges of such carrier 'would be added to
those of the company; and the delivery of the goods by the company would be considered as completed, and their responsibility
cease 'when the carriers received the goods for further conveyance.
The Great Western Railway line ended at Bristol, and the defendant's line began there and extended to Exeter, where it was joined
by the line of the South Devon Railway, which ran to Torquay.
The goods were conveyed to Bristol by the Great Western Rail-
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way and taken on in the same truck to Exeter, where they were
accidentally destroyed by fire. The Court of Exchequer held that
there was one contract with the Great Western Railway Company
for the conveyance of the goods from Bath to Torquay, subject to
the conditions in the receipt note, and consequently that they were
not responsible, being protected by the condition against loss by
fire. This decision was reversed in the Exchequer Chamber, 1 H.
& N. 517, consisting of eight judges, who held, that the Great
Western Railroad Company were not carriers beyond their line,
and that they were discharged by forwarding the goods to be carried
by the defendants, who received them as common carriers, and
were liable for their loss, the clause of exemption against responsibility for loss by fire, not applying to them. From this judgment
there was an appeal to the House of Lords : see Bristol &. Eetei
Bailway Co. v. Colins, 7 H. Lords Cases 194, where the original
judgment in the Court of Exchequer was affirmed on the ground
that the contract was with the Great Western Railway Company
alone, and that the Bristol and Exeter Company was not liable.
The judges who were summoned to advise their lordships differed
in their opinions, and even Lords WENSLEYDALE and KiNGsDoWN
expressed some doubt about the case. There were several circumstances which appear to have influenced the decision that there was
an entire contract by the Great Western Railway Company for the
carriage of the goods from Bath to Torquay. In the first place,
the goods were sent on from Bristol in a truck belonging to that
company, and a guard in their service was sent with them to Exeter.
In the next place, the charge for the carriage of the goods for the
whole distance from Bath to Torquay, was paid to the Great
Western Railway Company, and was called the company's charges.
And further, by the express terms of the receipt note, the goods
were to be sent to Torquay station, and delivered to the consignee
or his agent.
ALDERSON, B., delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer
says, "They contracted in express terms, on the face of the receipt
note, to carry the goods from Bath to Torquay." The bill of
lading in the present case says nothing about the delivery of the
goods, nor is there any express statement that they are to be carried
by the defendants to St. John; but they are "to be sent by the
Grand Trunk Railway Company, subject to the terms and conditions stated," 'which terms and conditions are, that they will be
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forwarded from Portland to their destination by public carriers or
otherwise, as opportunity may offer. It appears to us, that the
condition endorsed on the bill of lading was intended for the
express purpose of preventing the defendants from being held as
common carriers beyond the termination of their line of railway;
that they intended to limit their responsibility to that; and though
they agreed to forward goods to places beyond the limits of their line,
they stipulated, that in so doing, they would not themselves be the
carriers, or incur the liabilities of carriers. Their agreement to
forward the goods, as opportunity might offer, seems to be a
different obligation from that which the law would impose on them
as common carriers for the whole distance from Montreal to St.
John. That they bad a right to enter into such an agreement,
there can be no doubt. Another distinguishing circumstance
between this case and the case of Collins v. The Bristol and Exeter
Railway, is, that there is no evidence here of any payment or
agreement for payment of the freight to the defendants. The
payment of one sum for the carriage of goods to a certain place,
would, no doubt, be evidence of an undertaking by the company
to carry to that place: Wilby v. West Cornwall Railway Co.,
2 H. & N. 703. There is no evidence here of the defendants'
liability to carry the goods to St. John, unless it be found in the
bill of lading, and that seems to us to exclude the idea, that in
undertaking to forward the goods from Portland, they were discharging a part of their common law liability as carriers. The
case of Coxon v. The GreatWestern Railway Co., 5 H. & N. 274,
is to the same effect as Collins v. The Bristol and Exeter Railway
Co., and in Gordon v. The Great Western Railway Co., 34 U.
Can. Q. B. 224, where it was held that there was one entire
contract to carry goods from Cincinnati to Thorold in Canada,
though the company's line ended at Detroit, the bill of lading was
headed "contract for a through rate," and in the margin, the
words "For Gordon, McKay & Co., Thorold, Ontario, via Detroit
and Great Western Railway Company."
The courts of the United States hold that the liability of a railway
company for goods received for transportation, is prima facie
limited to the transitus over their own road; and, that in the
absence of a special contract, they are not liable for a loss after
the delivery of the goods to another company to be carried to their
place of destination: Nutting v. Connecticut River Railway Co., 1
Gray 502; Story on Bail. 538.
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It was contended in this case, that admitting the meaning of the
conditions endorsed on the bill of lading to be as we have stated,
there was no evidence that these conditions ;were brought to the
knowledge of Bell, the plaintiff's agent; and the jury have, no
doubt, so found. It is, perhaps, difficult to reconcile all the cases
which have arisen on this question of the knowledge of conditions
printed on the back of tickets or bills of lading. In several of them,
there was direct evidence of ignorance of the conditions; as, in Henderson v. Stevenson, Law Rep. 2 H. L. (So.) 470; Harrisv. Great
Western Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 Q. B. Div. 575; and Parker v.
S. Eastern Railway Co., Law Rep. 2 0. P. Div. 416. In the first
of these cases, there was no reference on the face of the ticket, to
the conditions on the back, which distinguished it from the case of
Harris v. Great Western Railway Co., as pointed out by BLACKBURN, J.; and in Parkerv. S. Eastern Railway Co., BRAMWELL,
L. J., differed from the other members of the court, being of opinion
that the plaintiff, who knew that there was something printed on
the back of the ticket, was bound by it, whether he had read it or
not. And this agrees with what is said in 'an Toll v. The S.
Eastern Railway Co., 12 0. B. N: S. 75; and Stewart v. The
London and N. Western Railway Co., 3 H. & C. 185, that a person must be presumed to know what he has the means of knowing,
whether he avails himself of those means or not. The bill of lading
here on its face, informed the plaintiff's agent that the defendants
received the goods on certain conditions, and it is not open to the
plaintiff now to say that he did not know what those conditions
were.
In Harris v. Great Western Railway Co., supra, BLACKBURN, J., says: "The ticket has on the face of it, a plain and unequivocal reference to the conditions printed on the back of it, and
any person who read that reference could, without difficulty, look
at the back and see what these conditions were; and that being so,
the question comes to be, whether the plaintiff is not precluded
from setting up, that Mr. Harris, who acted for her in taking the
ticket, never looked at the face of it, or bestowed a thought on what
the conditions were. In other words, whether by depositing the
goods and taking the ticket, he did not so act, as to induce the
defendants to enter into the contract with him in the belief that
he had assented to its terms. I think he has so acted." The
same principle will be found in the York and Berwick Railway

446

ARMSTRONG v. GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY CO.

Co. v. CWisp, 14 0. B. 527; and in Lewis v. J1eKee, Law Rep. 4
Exch. 58.
In Parker v. S. BJastern Railway Co., Law Rep. 2 C. P. Div.
416, MELLISH, L. J., admits that there may be cases where a party
would be bound by the contents of paper delivered to him, though
he had never read it; and he instances the case of a person who
ships goods and receives a bill of lading signed by the master, who
would be bound by the exceptions contained in it in favor of the
shipowner. And why should not the same principle apply to a
contract for the carriage of goods by land? There is abundant evidence, in the absence of any negative proof by Bell, that the conditions were brought to his knowledge, or, at least, that he had the
means of knowing them, and, therefore, the plaintiff is bound by
them. On this point the finding of the jury was clearly against
the evidence. It was contended further, that even if Bell had
knowledge of the conditions, the plaintiff is not bound by them,
because common carriers cannot stipulate against liability for their
own negligence. Admitting that, at the time the goods were destroyed, the defendants held them as common carriers, they clearly
had a right to stipulate against a liability for loss by accident. A
carrier may limit his common-law liability so as not to be responsible for a loss by fire, occasioned without negligence on his part.
See Pemberton v. New York Central Railway Co., 104 Mass.
144; Hoadly v. Northern Transportation Co.,.115 Id. 804; New
Jersey Steamboat Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank of Boston,
6 How. 344; Vyld v. Pickford, 8 M. & W. 443; Bristol &
Exeter Railway Co. v. Collins, 7 H. of L. 0. 194 ; Phillips v.
Clark, 1 C. B. N. S. 156; Ohilffv. Briscall,Law Rep. 1 P. 0. 231.
Now the fire by which these goods were destroyed, was not attributable to any negligence of the defendants; and, therefore, if they
are liable at all for their loss, it is because they were guilty of
negligence in not forwarding them to St. John at an earlier period.
See McCrosson v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 23 U. Can. 0. P.
107.
. The evidence as to the time the goods arrived at Portland, and
whether they could have been sent from thence by steamer before the
9th of August, when the fire occurred, was very loose and uncertain. Whether the burthen of proving negligence was on the plaintiff, or whether the defendants were bound to disprove it, would
depend upon the character in which they held the goods at the time
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of the loss-whether as carriers or as warehousemen, for the purpose of being forwarded to St. John, under the terms of the 10th
condition. We are of opinion that they held them in the latter
character, and that there was not evidence to warrant the jury in
finding that they were guilty of negligence, on the first question
submitted.
As to the promise of the defendant's freight agent to pay for the
goods, we are inclined to think the evidence should not have been
received. But, at all events, if the defendants could be bound by
his promise, it was only conditional to pay if the goods were not
insured by the plaintiff, and there was no evidence whether they
were so or not: consequently, the finding on that point was also
against evidence.
As, in our opinion, the evidence failed to make out the plaintiff's
claim, a nonsuit must be entered according to the agreement at the
trial.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.
KEFFELL v. BULLOCK.
The action of an infant must be brought by his guardian or next friend, who
alone is liable for the costs. The infant is not liable to a judgment therefor.
Nor is he liable to a judgment for costs after arriving at full age, in an action
brought without a guardian or next friend, but not terminated during infancy, if,
on reaching his majority, at the first opportunity, he disclaim all benefit from the
proceeding, and refuse to proceed further with the case.
An offer to confess judgment duly made in the court where the action is brought
need not be renewed in the Appellate Court in order to be available to the party
making it on final judgment.
By the legislation in Nebraska all the disabilities of Infancy as they exist by the
common law are fully recoguised.

LAKE, J.-The defendant in error commenced an action in the
County Court for Dodge county against the plaintiff in error, to
recover on an account for goods furnished, and labor performed, a
balance claimed to be due of $66.90. Immediately upon being
summoned the plaintiff in error offered to confess a judgment for
the sum of $40, together with the costs then accrued, as provided in sect. 1004 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by which it is
enacted that, "If the defendant at any time before trial, offer in
writing to allow judgment to be taken against him for a specified
sum, the plaintiff may immediately have judgment therefor, with
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the costs then accrued. But if he do not accept such offer before
the trial, and fail to recover in the action a sum equal to the offer,
he cannot recover costs accrued after the offer, but costs must be
adjudged against him. But the offer and failure to accept it cannot
be given in evidence to affect the recovery, otherwise than as to
costs, as above provided." The recovery being less than this offer,
the defendant in error had judgment in his favor for the amount of
the verdict and costs before the filing of the offer, but against him
for all costs made subsequently to that time.
From this judgment the defendant in error appealed to the
District Court, where the verdict in his favor was for a still smaller
amount. Whereupon, on the 2d day of April 1878, he filed a
motion for judgmnent on the verdict, and for his costs, notwithstanding the said offer to confess, and at the same time proved to the
court the fact, then for the first time brought to its attention, that
he was still a minor, and would not attain his majority until the
6th day of September of that year. On the 7th of October, while
this motion was still pending, and before any further step had been
taken in the case, the defendant in error, by special appearance,
disclaimed all right to the verdict, or benefit under it, and insisted
on "his minority as a bar to any judgment against him for any
costs in this case." Acting upon this disclaimer, and the unquestioned minority of' the defendant in error as stated, the court
dismissed the case generally, and, against the demand of the plaintiff in error, refused to enter judgment in his favor for his costs.
This refusal is the ground of the alleged error, and to correct which
the case is brought to this court.
The first question to be disposed of is one of practice, raised by
defendant in error in his brief. He contends that in order to make
an offer to confess judgment under the statute available to the
party making it on appeal, the offer must be renewed in the Appellate Court. We cannot so hold. The offer once properly entered,
becomes a part of the record of the case, and if not withdrawn, is
just as available on final judgment in the Appellate Court as it
could have been in the court where made, had no appeal been
taken.
The next, and main question presented by the record is much
more difficult, and altogether novel in this court. By our legislation all the disabilities of infants, as they exist at common law, are
fully recognised. Indeed we are not aware of any statute in this
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state modifying them in any respect whatever. Accordingly, we
find that section thirty-six, of the Code of Civil Procedure, provides that: "The action of an infant must be brought by his guardian or next friend." And even when brought by his next friend,
if it be discovered that the action is not for the infant's benefit, the
court, on its own motion, may dismiss it. Our practice in this
respect seems to be based upon the unquestionable presumption of
law that, until a person arrives at full age, no matter what his
mental attainments and experience in life may be, he has not sufficient capacity to decide for himself whether the action would
probably benefit him, or whether under all the circumstances it
ought to be brought. Observing still further the common law
respecting suits by infants, our code, section thirty-seven, provides
that: "The guardian or next friend is liable for the costs of the
action brought by him." Thus implying very clearly that even
although the infant has had the benefit of the judgment of a person
of mature years as to the propriety of bringing the action, yet if it
result disastrously to him, he shall not be liable to a judgment for
the costs. Indeed, one of the chief objects in requiring a next friend
seems to be, as was said in Heft et at. v. He Gilt et at., 3 Penn. St.
256, "to supply the want of capacity in the infant, to afford in his
own person a party on the record responsible for costs." And we
find that independently of statutory regulation, the rule seems to be
that no judgment for costs can be rendered against an infant plaintiff: Bowehe v. Riyan, 3 Blackf. 472: Sproule v. Botts, 5 J. J.
Marsh. 162. But in Massachusetts, under a peculiar statute, it is
held that an infant plaintiff, and not his prochein ami, is liable to
judgment for costs. In one case, WILDE, J., remarked: "The
defendants claim costs against the prochein ami, on the ground
that the plaintiff being an infant is not liable therefor; and this
claim seems to be supported by the English practice. But our
practice seems to be different, and is conformable to our statutes
regulating the recovery of costs." In that state, in order to
make the prochein ami liable for costs, he must endorse the writ
therefor: ,Smith v. Floyd, 1 Pick. 275; Crandall v. Ctaid and
Wife, 11 Mete. 288. We have no statute similar to that of Massachusetts, but, as before shown, our legislation harmonized completely with the practice under the common law, both in England
and in this country.
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Now it would seem to be a reasonable conclusion from what we
have already shown, that had judgment been rendered against the
defendant in error while he was still a minor, it would have been
erroneous. If an infant plaintiff who has had the advice of a
guardian or next friend, as to the propriety of commencing his
action, cannot be required to pay costs when defeated, upon what
principle can he be adjudged to pay them when he has been so
indiscrete as to proceed without such aid, relying alone upon his
own immature judgment in the matter? We know of none.
It may seem a hardship on the plaintiff in error, to be put to
the expense of defending against what was proven to be an unjust
demand without recourse finally against the claimant. But this
result he could have successfully guarded against by pleading the
infancy of the plaintiff in the action in abatement at the outset, by
which he would either have brought into the case a responsible
"next friend," who would have been liable for costs, or obtained a
dismissal of the action without further trouble or expense. It only
remains now to inquire whether by reason of the defendant in error
having arrived at Is majority, before the termination of the action,
a judgment against him for costs would have been proper.
From analogy to the cases of the ratification of the voidable acts
of infants after becoming of full age, we think it clear that if, after
reaching his majority, he had either assented to judgment on the
verdict, or taken a single step in the further prosecution of the
action, all the privileges of infancy would thereby have been fully
waived, and he would have been bound by the action of the court.
But the record shows that, at the very first opportunity after he
reached the age of twenty-one years, he disclaimed all benefit from
what had been done in the case, and in the most unequivocal manner
deuie'd the juriscliction of the court to proceed further. Our
opinion is that a judgment against the defendant in error, under
these circumstances., would be equally as erroneous as if it had renderedawhile he was yet an infant.
Judgment affirmed.

